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I.

INTRODUCTION

In an environment in which corporate officials complain to Congress
about the existence of patent “trolls,”1 perhaps it should not come as a surprise that patent law reform proposals are finding a receptive audience.
Major reports on the patent system compiled by the Federal Trade Commission (FTC)2 and the National Academy of Sciences (NAS)3 advocate a
number of reforms touching on both the administrative processes of the
patent system and the treatment of patent rights in the courts. While the

© 2004 Mark D. Janis
† Professor of Law and H. Blair & Joan V. White Intellectual Property Law
Scholar, University of Iowa College of Law.
1. See Patent Quality Improvement: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Courts, the
Internet and Intellectual Property of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 198th Cong. 21
(2003) [hereinafter Patent Quality Improvement Hearings] (testimony of David Simon)
(defining patent trolls as “patent system bottom feeders” who buy “improvidently-granted
patents from distressed companies for the sole purpose of suing legitimate businesses”).
2. FED. TRADE COMM’N, TO PROMOTE INNOVATION: THE PROPER BALANCE OF
COMPETITION AND PATENT LAW AND POLICY (2003) [hereinafter FTC REPORT], available
at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2003/10/innovationrpt.pdf.
3. NAT’L ACAD. OF SCIS., A PATENT SYSTEM FOR THE 21ST CENTURY (Stephen A.
Merrill et al. eds., forthcoming 2004) [hereinafter NAS STUDY], available at http://www.nap.edu/books/0309089107.html.
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reform proposals are not particularly notable for their originality,4 they are
presented with a tone of urgency that has not been heard for some years.
The FTC Report identifies patent litigation as one area in need of scrutiny and selects the presumption of patent validity5 in patent litigation as a
particular target for reform. According to the FTC Report, the existence of
the presumption is “not objectionable” because the patent challenger
should bear the burden of overcoming the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office’s (USPTO) determination of patentability.6 The Report’s objections
focus on the standard of evidence for overcoming the presumption, and
here, the FTC can discern “no persuasive reason” why the existing clear
and convincing evidence standard should be retained.7 Instead, patent
challengers should be able to overcome the presumption of validity by
evidence that meets the preponderance standard, according to the Report.8
In one respect, it is not surprising that the FTC has focused on the presumption of patent validity. The presumption is an easy target; it enhances
the leverage of the patent trolls.9 However, in another respect, the new focus on the presumption of validity may seem startling, at least to those
within the patent community. The Federal Circuit’s pronouncements on
the presumption of validity have become routine. In dozens of decisions,
the Federal Circuit has repeated core principles: the patent challenger
bears the ultimate burden of persuasion on patent invalidity;10 to carry this
burden, the patent challenger must establish relevant facts by clear and
convincing evidence;11 clear and convincing evidence is “evidence which
4. Most of the proposals are eerily familiar, having been proposed—and
discarded—in previous episodes of patent law reform stretching back to the 19th
Century. I have previously commented on the reiterative nature of patent law reform.
Mark D. Janis, Patent Abolitionism, 17 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 899 (2002).
5. 35 U.S.C. § 282 (2000) (providing in relevant part that, “A patent shall be
presumed valid. Each claim of a patent . . . shall be presumed valid independently of the
validity of other claims . . . . The burden of establishing invalidity of a patent or any
claim thereof shall rest on the party asserting such invalidity.”).
6. FTC REPORT, supra note 2, ch. 5, at 28.
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. According to David Simon, “These patent trolls have the presumption of validity
on their side. It is difficult to convince a jury of patent invalidity in light of the
heightened evidentiary standard of clear and convincing evidence.” Patent Improvement
Quality Hearings, supra note 1, at 4 (testimony of David Simon).
10. See, e.g., New England Braiding Co. v. A.W. Chesterton Co., 970 F.2d 878, 882
(Fed. Cir. 1992) (“The presumption acts as a procedural device which places the burden
of going forward with evidence and the ultimate burden of persuasion of invalidity at trial
on the alleged infringer.”).
11. See, e.g., Geneva Pharm., Inc. v. GlaxoSmithKline PLC, 349 F.3d 1373 (Fed.
Cir. 2003) (upholding summary judgment of invalidity for double patenting).
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produces in the mind of the trier of fact an abiding conviction that the truth
of the factual contentions is highly probable.”12
This Article critically examines the FTC’s proposals concerning the
presumption of validity. In Part II, I identify two general functions of presumptions in law, the expressive and instrumental functions. In Part III, I
argue that the FTC’s proposal overlooks the expressive function of the
presumption of patent validity and I consider the insights that might be
gained from considering the expressive function. In Part IV, I analyze the
FTC’s arguments touching on the instrumental function of the presumption of validity, and conclude that they are plausible, but deserve refinement and further probing.
II.

EXPRESSIVE AND INSTRUMENTAL FUNCTIONS OF
PRESUMPTIONS

The FTC Report’s proposal to reform the presumption of validity provokes some fundamental questions about patent validity adjudication.
Most directly, the Report encourages the patent community to think more
carefully about what the presumption of validity is designed to accomplish. We might answer the question by returning to first principles—by
considering the functions that presumptions are generally designed to perform in law and evaluating the reform proposals in light of those functions.
The Supreme Court has provided a framework for understanding presumptions and standards of evidence for overcoming presumptions. In
Addington v. Texas,13 a civil commitment case involving a debate over the
applicability of the clear and convincing standard (as opposed to the beyond a reasonable doubt standard), the Court attributed two functions to
standards of proof: (1) “to indicate the relative importance attached to the
ultimate decision;”14 and (2) to allocate the risk of error between the litigants.15 The first may be described as the “expressive” function and the
second as an “instrumental” function.
Evaluating a rule in light of its expressive function requires identifying
the rule’s overlying message and assessing that message’s impact. Scholars have recognized that many debates “over the appropriate content of
law” are in some part “debates over the statement that law makes”—that
12. Buildex, Inc. v. Kason Indus., Inc., 849 F.2d 1461, 1463 (Fed. Cir. 1988)
(internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
13. 441 U.S. 418 (1979).
14. Id. at 423.
15. Id.
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is, debates over law’s expressive function.16 A legal rule might be expressive in a weaker and a stronger sense. In the weaker sense, a rule may be
purely symbolic, intended to accomplish nothing other than to make a
statement, and it may succeed even if it is never actually enforced.17 In the
stronger sense, a rule might be designed to provide a baseline for the eventual fashioning of new norms of behavior, without a tight connection between the rule and the behavior. The rule is designed to accomplish something other than merely to make a statement, but the statement is at least as
important as the precise manner in which the rule is enforced.18 For example, the presumption of innocence in criminal cases is emblematic of our
paramount concern about individual freedom and our deeply-rooted distrust of the power of the state. If the legislature proposed to “reform” the
presumption of innocence, any thoughtful analysis of that proposal would
need to consider how the proposal might alter the overlying message associated with the presumption and the broad social consequences of that alteration. An analysis that considered only the projected effects on actual
case outcomes would be incomplete.
Evaluating a rule in light of its instrumental function requires assessing
how the rule affects case outcomes. For example, in a criminal case, we
might justify the strong presumption of innocence and its associated beyond a reasonable doubt standard by asserting that the overwhelming
share of the risk of error (meaning an erroneous legal determination deriving from the found facts) should be allocated to the state.19 By contrast, in
an ordinary civil case for damages, we might argue that no particular presumption is justified; the risk of error should be allocated equally among
the parties, and thus application of a preponderance of the evidence standard would be appropriate.20 If these respective classes of cases are considered to lie at opposite extremes of a spectrum, then there may be a class
of intermediate cases that correlate with an intermediate standard. Civil
cases may fall into this intermediate zone when the interests at stake are
more important than loss of money, and in such cases, it would be inappropriate to allocate the risk of error equally. Thus, a moderate presumption should apply coupled to an intermediate standard, such as the clear
and convincing standard, for overcoming the presumption. Accordingly,
16. E.g., Cass R. Sunstein, On the Expressive Function of Law, 144 U. PA. L. REV.
2021, 2051 (1996).
17. Id. at 2023 (asserting that a proscription against flag-burning is an example of a
rule that is expressive in the weaker sense, in that the flag-burning rule is not necessarily
designed with the expectation that it will deter potential flag-burners).
18. Id. at 2025-27.
19. Addington, 441 U.S. at 423-24 (making this argument).
20. Id.
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an analysis of a legal presumption from an instrumental perspective takes
the presumption as a tool for achieving precise outcomes and assesses
whether the presumption facilitates those outcomes.
We can understand the presumption of patent validity against this general backdrop. The FTC Report’s proposed reforms to the presumption of
validity should be considered in light of both the expressive and instrumental dimensions of the presumption. I take up that task in the remainder
of this Article.
III.

EXPRESSIVE FUNCTION OF THE PRESUMPTION OF
VALIDITY

Consideration of law’s expressive function has significant implications
for patent law, a point that I develop in more detail elsewhere.21 Evaluating the FTC Report’s reform proposals by considering the expressive
function of the presumption of validity reveals three important insights.
First, acknowledgment of the presumption’s expressive function reminds
us that the fact that we have a presumption of patent validity is as significant as the precise verbal formulation that we use for the standard of evidence for overcoming the presumption. Second, while it may be easy
enough to manipulate that verbal formulation, it may be a very different
and very subtle exercise to control the overlying message that the presumption of patent validity delivers, especially outside the patent community. Third, manipulating the verbal formulation without controlling the
overlying message may yield some unpleasant surprises.
In particular, “reforming” the words of the evidentiary standard without controlling the overlying message may, ironically, result in changing
everything while changing nothing. That is, one possible outcome of the
proposed change to the preponderance standard for overcoming the presumption of patent validity is that the change will cause little difference in
the outcomes of cases but, at least in the short term, those outside the patent community may perceive a dramatic change in the overlying message.
Thus, judges will reach the same result that they would have reached under the old standard, substituting the words of the new standard but the
perception may be that patents are less secure and the patent system deserves less respect.
The Supreme Court made a similar point in Addington. The Court expressed doubt about whether the choice of standard between clear and
convincing and preponderance of the evidence would often make a difference in case outcomes, especially since it would be unwise to expect that
21. Mark D. Janis, Patent Law’s Expressive Quality (Working Paper, 2004).
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fact finders, particularly lay juries, would be adept at understanding the
nuanced differences between the standards.22 At the same time, the Court
resisted the notion that adoption of a particular standard of proof was a
mere “empty semantic exercise.”23
To illustrate the point about the potential for divergence between the
words of the evidentiary standard and the overlying message of the presumption of validity, I consider three sets of cases: (1) cases immediately
preceding the creation of the Federal Circuit, compared to early Federal
Circuit cases; (2) more recent Federal Circuit cases; and (3) trademark
cases adopting the preponderance standard.
A.
Pre-Federal Circuit and Early Federal Circuit Cases on the
Presumption of Validity
The adoption of the clear and convincing standard is widely attributed
to the Federal Circuit, as the FTC Report points out.24 The perception that
the Federal Circuit enhanced the effect of the presumption of validity coincides with the generally received wisdom that the Federal Circuit
adopted a pro-patent bias early in its tenure.25 In turn, this correlates with
one of the FTC Report’s themes: that the balance between patent and
competition policy has swung too far in favor of patents.26
The actual story is more complex. Contrary to common perception, before the creation of the Federal Circuit, most appellate courts had already
adopted the clear and convincing standard of evidence for overcoming the
presumption of patent validity.27 Only the Sixth Circuit appeared to have
22. Addington, 441 U.S. at 424-25.
23. Id. at 425.
24. FTC REPORT, supra note 2, ch. 5, at 26 n.183.
25. Mark D. Janis, Patent Law in the Age of the Invisible Supreme Court, 2001 U.
ILL. L. REV. 387, 399-401.
26. E.g., FTC REPORT, supra note 2, ch. 2, at 18-23.
27. It appears that the Courts of Appeals for the Second, Third, Fifth, Seventh,
Eighth, and Ninth Circuits all had adopted the clear and convincing standard. See, e.g., 2
DONALD S. CHISUM, PATENTS § 5.06 n.84 (2003) (citing relevant authority). For
representative language, see, for example., Manufactoring Research Corp. v. Graybar
Elec. Co., 679 F.2d 1355, 1360 (11th Cir. 1982) (noting that the burden of establishing
invalidity “is generally an onerous one” and requires the patent challenger to
“demonstrate invalidity by clear and convincing evidence”), and Hobbs v. United States
Atomic Energy Commission, 451 F.2d 849, 856 (5th Cir. 1971) (“[T]he presumption of
patent validity may be rebutted only by a quantum of proof—whether it be called clear
and convincing or beyond a reasonable doubt—which is greater than a mere
preponderance.”). The Eighth Circuit followed a “substantial evidence” standard, but
noted that “the proof which was considered adequate under the substantial evidence
standard here would also suffice under the clear and convincing evidence test.” Clark
Equip. Co. v. Keller, 570 F.2d 778, 795 n.17 (8th Cir. 1978).
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squarely adopted a preponderance standard, and the court still required
clear and convincing evidence where the prior art at issue was oral testimony of prior invention.28 Despite the Sixth Circuit’s adoption of the preponderance standard, the overlying message was that the patent system
was “in distress,”29 and that the presumption of validity was meaningless.30
Soon after the creation of the Federal Circuit, the court adopted the
clear and convincing standard31—hardly a watershed event, considering
that the clear and convincing standard was already the majority rule. In
addition, the Federal Circuit also addressed whether the presumption applied to prior art that the USPTO never had considered. The court held that
the presumption still applied to such art, but that the patent challenger’s
burden was easier to discharge because the added burden of deference to
the USPTO was absent.32 We might similarly suppose that this, too, was
28. See, e.g., Dickstein v. Seventy Corp., 522 F.2d 1294, 1297 (6th Cir. 1975); see
also Saginaw Prod. Corp. v. E. Airlines, Inc., 615 F.2d 1136, 1240 (6th Cir. 1980)
(utilizing the preponderance standard).
29. Abe Fortas, The Patent System in Distress, 53 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF.
SOC’Y 810 (1971).
30. According to former Justice Fortas:
Of course the law says that a properly issued patent is presumptively
valid. But confronted by judicial hostility, this presumption is about as
formidable as a silk screen against a machine gun. To many appellate
judges, the presumption is something to acknowledge, and then to show
that it’s not controlling.
Id. at 810. To be sure, the fact that some courts were holding that the presumption of
validity only applied to art that the USPTO had considered probably contributed to this
message.
31. E.g., Am. Hoist & Derrick Co. v. Sowa & Sons, Inc., 725 F.2d 1350, 1360 (Fed.
Cir. 1984). Indeed, in doing so, the Federal Circuit rejected a beyond a reasonable doubt
standard, presumably an inappropriate standard for civil patent cases in the modern
understanding, but still a formulation that enjoyed considerable support in older patent
cases. See Trans-World Mfg. Corp. v. Al Nyman & Sons, Inc., 750 F.2d 1552, 1560 (Fed.
Cir. 1984) (discussing the issue and concluding that it was proper for the district court to
instruct the jury that the clear and convincing standard applied to invalidity
determinations).
32. According to Judge Rich in American Hoist:
When no prior art other than that which was considered by the USPTO
examiner is relied on by the attacker, he has the added burden of
overcoming the deference that is due to a qualified government agency
presumed to have properly done its job. . . . [¶] When an attacker, in
sustaining the burden imposed by § 282, produces prior art or other
evidence not considered in the USPTO, there is, however, no reason to
defer to the USPTO so far as its effect on validity is concerned. . . .
What the production of new prior art or other invalidating evidence not
before the USPTO does is to eliminate, or at least reduce, the element
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hardly a notable departure from pre-Federal Circuit law, because it seemed
to leave courts free to act as they did prior to the establishment of the Federal Circuit: refusing to give the presumption of validity any real meaning
in litigation involving newly-discovered prior art.
Yet the tone of the Federal Circuit’s early opinions on the presumption
of validity, in the context of other events then occurring in the patent system,33 resulted in a very palpable change in the overlying message: the
new message was that the Federal Circuit had “strengthened” the presumption of validity and had made it meaningful once again. The lesson
here is important: there is no strict, inevitable correlation between the
words of the evidentiary standard and the overlying message delivered by
the presumption of validity. The message is independently significant for
purposes of patent policy and, of course, for purposes of patent policy reform.
B.
Modern Federal Circuit Cases
The Federal Circuit has never changed the words of the evidentiary
standard for overcoming the presumption of patent validity. The court has
instead repeated the standard in dozens, perhaps hundreds of opinions.34
Yet it would be a mistake to assume that, because the words of the standard have remained constant throughout the Federal Circuit’s tenure, the
message of the presumption of validity has likewise remained constant or
that there is a tight connection between the words of the standard and specific case outcomes.

of deference due the USPTO, thereby partially, if not wholly,
discharging the attacker’s burden, but neither shifting nor lightening it
or changing the standard of proof.
725 U.S. at 1359 (emphasis original).
33. Events such as the consolidation of power in the new court, the character and
track record of the judges on the new court, and the command that the new court “unify”
patent law. For more on the before and after story on the presumption of validity, see
Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, The Federal Circuit: A Case Study in Specialized Courts, 64
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 6, 18-21 (1989).
34. A few recent examples include: Elan Corp., PLC v. Andrx Pharmaceuticals,
Inc., 366 F.3d 1336, 1340 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (“Patents are presumed to be valid, 35 U.S.C.
§ 282 (2000), and an accused infringer challenging the validity of a patent under the onsale bar must demonstrate by ‘clear and convincing evidence . . . .’”); Golden Blount, Inc.
v. Robert H. Peterson Co., 365 F.3d 1054, 1058 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (“To establish
invalidity, the supporting facts must be shown by ‘clear and convincing evidence.’”);
Norian Corp. v. Striker Corp., 363 F.3d 1321, 1326 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (“The jury was
correctly instructed that a party seeking to invalidate a patent must do so by clear and
convincing evidence.”).
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The Federal Circuit’s cases contain isolated hints that the standard is
reasonably fluid despite the court’s pro forma deployment of it. For example, when it perceives a good case for invalidating claims, the Federal Circuit has been known to observe that “even under a ‘clear and convincing’
standard, proof need not be airtight.”35 The court has also held that the
jury need not be instructed that the presumption of validity exists, so long
as the jury is instructed that facts establishing invalidity must be tested by
the clear and convincing standard.36
The Federal Circuit’s Rochester opinion illustrates the fluidity of the
clear and convincing standard.37 The claims concerned methods to inhibit
the activity of the human COX-2 enzyme (implicated in arthritis) by administering a compound that “selectively inhibits activity of the [COX-2]
gene product.”38 The patent disclosed the existence and function of COX2, as well as a screening assay for determining whether a screened drug
displayed the COX-2 selectivity.39 However, the patent did not disclose
any actual drug possessing the desired COX-2 selectivity, and the patentee
(Rochester) acquiesced in the defendant’s assertion that no actual drug existed as of the application filing date.40 The defendant (Searle) challenged
validity on written description grounds and prevailed on summary judgment before the district court.41 On appeal, Rochester argued that because
Searle had not introduced any evidence in support of the written description theory, Searle could not as a matter of law overcome the presumption
of validity.42 However, the Federal Circuit disagreed. According to the
court, the presumption of validity does not foreclose the possibility that
“the patent in suit proves its own validity” and Rochester’s patent “clearly
and convincingly does just that.”43
Rochester reinforces the proposition developed in the preceding section: that the Federal Circuit is capable of changing the overlying message
delivered by the presumption of validity without changing the language of
the evidentiary standard. If it becomes de rigueur at the Federal Circuit to
35. Buildex Inc. v. Kason Indus., Inc., 849 F.2d, 1461, 1464 (Fed. Cir. 1988)
(overturning the district court’s fact finding as to the existence of a pre-critical date offer
as clearly erroneous and thus reversing the district court’s legal conclusion that the patent
was not invalid for violating the on-sale bar).
36. Chiron Corp. v. Genentech, Inc., 363 F.3d 1247 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
37. University of Rochester v. G.D. Searle & Co., 358 F.3d 916 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
38. Id. at 918 (quoting U.S. Patent No. 6, 048,850 (issued Apr. 11, 2000)).
39. Id.
40. Id. at 930.
41. Id. at 919.
42. Id. at 930.
43. Id.
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speak of patents clearly and convincingly proving their own invalidity,
then, with the passage of time, the overlying message of the presumption
of validity will change even if the language of the evidentiary standard
remains constant.
By analogous reasoning, we should be wary of a reform proposal that
seeks to effectuate changes in case outcomes simply by changing the language of the evidentiary standard. Such a proposal presumes a tight connection between the language of the standard and the outcomes of cases.
That is, it fixates on the instrumental function of the presumption of validity to the apparent exclusion of the expressive function. In so doing, it exaggerates the extent to which changes to the language of the presumption
can be used as a strategy for fine-tuning the patent systems.
C.
Trademark Cases: Experience with the Preponderance
Standard
Experience with trademark cases reinforces the point that the words of
the evidentiary standard and the message associated with a presumption of
validity may diverge such that case outcomes are very difficult to predict
based merely on the choice of evidentiary standard. The current regime for
adjudicating trademark validity resembles the FTC Report’s proposed regime for adjudicating patent validity. The Lanham Act provides a presumption of validity for marks registered on the Principal Register,44 and a
number of courts have embraced the preponderance standard as the quantum of evidence required to overcome the presumption. Despite the existence of a statutory presumption of validity, many courts seem to have
taken the message that the presumption in trademark cases is to be ignored
altogether: in many decisions, the presumption either is not mentioned at
all or is largely trivialized.45 For example, in Tie Tech, Inc. v. Kinedyne
Corp., Tie Tech registered the product configuration trade dress of its
hand-held welding cutter.46 After a lengthy prosecution, including an ap44. 15 U.S.C. § 1115(a) (2000) (providing that a mark registered on the Principal
Register “shall be prima facie evidence of the validity of the registered mark”).
45. Courts have held that the presumption only shifts the burden of production to the
trademark challenger. E.g., Liquid Controls Corp. v. Liquid Control Corp., 802 F.2d 934,
937 (7th Cir. 1986). Also, some courts have held that the presumptions are of the bursting
bubble variety: where the trademark challenger has met the burden of producing rebuttal
evidence, the presumptions disappear. Igloo Products Corp. v. Brantex, Inc., 202 F.3d
814 (5th Cir. 2000); Lane Capital Mgmt., Inc. v. Lane Capital Mgmt., Inc., 192 F.3d 337
(2d Cir. 1999); Door Sys., Inc. v. Pro-Line Door Sys., Inc., 83 F.3d 169 (7th Cir. 1996).
But see Americana Trading, Inc. v. Russ Berrie & Co., 966 F.2d 1284 (9th Cir. 1992)
(rare example of a case calling for a district court to give greater weight to the
presumptive effect of registration).
46. 296 F.3d 778, 781 (9th Cir. 2002).
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peal to the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board, the registration issued.47
One of the principal issues in the prosecution was the functionality of the
claimed trade dress.48 Tie Tech subsequently sued Kinedyne for the trade
dress infringement, but Kinedyne won on summary judgment on the
ground that the registration was invalid for functionality.49 On appeal, the
Ninth Circuit acknowledged that “the plaintiff in an infringement action
with a registered mark is given the prima facie or presumptive advantage
on the issue of validity, thus shifting the burden of production to the defendant to prove otherwise.”50 However, the court made clear that the effect of the presumption was negligible. According to the court, once the
presumption of validity was overcome, “the mark’s registration is merely
evidence ‘of registration,’ nothing more.”51 Thus, the Ninth Circuit rejected the proposition that the registration “should be treated as something
of an expert’s affidavit on its validity.”52 Moreover, the court asked very
little of the defendant in agreeing with the lower court that the defendant
had overcome the presumption of validity. The defendant merely presented functionality allegations that likely were the same as those raised
during the prosecution.53 It is difficult to discern how the existence of the
registration, and the corresponding presumption, made any material difference in the case.54
In other decisions, the presumption and the associated preponderance
standard is a matter of controversy. For example, in Burke-ParsonsBowlby Corp. v. Appalachian Log Homes, Inc.,55 the validity issue centered on whether the mark “APPALACHIAN LOG STRUCTURES” used
in connection with the construction of log residences was primarily geo47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 781-82.
50. Id. at 783.
51. Id.
52. Id. at 784.
53. See id. at 783 (reciting the three aspects the defendant cited it believed to be
functional).
54. Functionality provides a particularly good illustration. In cases involving
unregistered trade dress, the Lanham Act expressly assigns to plaintiffs the burden of
proving non-functionality. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(3) (2000). Had Tie Tech involved
unregistered trade dress, the plaintiff would have been required to produce evidence
raising a fact issue as to functionality pursuant to discharging its burden of proof. In the
actual case, the plaintiff was compelled to produce evidence raising a fact issue as to
functionality pursuant to discharging its burden of coming forward with evidence in
response to defendant’s allegations. Tie Tech, 296 F.3d at 784-86. In practical terms, it is
difficult to distinguish between the two.
55. 871 F.2d 590 (6th Cir. 1989).
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graphically descriptive, and, if so, whether the mark owner had demonstrated evidence of secondary meaning.56 In the registration process, the
trademark examiner requested evidence of secondary meaning, the applicant submitted evidence, and consequently, the examiner acceded to registration.57 In subsequent litigation, the district court had invalidated the registration on the grounds that the mark was geographically descriptive and
the evidence of secondary meaning was insufficient to overcome descriptiveness.58 The Sixth Circuit upheld the district court, stating that while
the USPTO’s decisions were given deference, the presumption was rebuttable, and plaintiff’s evidence of secondary meaning was insufficient.59
However, the remaining judges disagreed as to the effect of the
presumption. According to Judge Krupansky, in his concurring opinion,
the presumption did not even shift the ultimate burden of proof from the
trademark owner.60 Instead, once the trademark challenger introduced evidence rebutting the presumption—which seemed to require little here—the
ultimate burden of proof, including the heavy burden of proving secondary
meaning, reverted to the trademark owner.61 In contrast, Judge Guy’s dissent offered a dramatically different view of the effect of the presumption
of validity. Judge Guy argued that a trademark challenger must submit
“very persuasive” evidence to overcome the presumption.62 Quoting from
an old Second Circuit decision,63 Judge Guy asserted that the trademark
challenger not only bears the burden of going forward to challenge validity, but also bears the burden of proof. The presumption of validity is
“strong,” and courts should not “overrule the action of the Patent Office to
whose care Congress has entrusted the preliminary determination as to
whether a mark fulfills the requirements of the statute.”64
In fairness, any confusion that might result from adopting a preponderance standard for patent validity would probably be less severe than
56. Id. at 592-93
57. Id. at 595.
58. Id. at 595-96.
59. Id. at 596.
60. Id. at 597 (Krupansky, J., concurring).
61. Id. (Krupansky, J., concurring).
62. Id.at 598 (Guy, J., dissenting).
63. Id. at 598-99 (Guy., J., dissenting) (quoting Aluminum Fabricating Co. v.
Season All-Window Corp., 259 F.2d 314, 316 (2d Cir. 1958)). Illustrating the
malleability of the preponderance standard, the Second Circuit in Aluminimum was
evidently applying a preponderance of the evidence standard for overcoming this strong
presumption of validity. The Second Circuit remarked that in order to prevail, the
trademark challenger had to “put something more into the scales than the registrant” had
put into the scales. Aluminum, 259 F.2d at 316.
64. Burke-Parsons-Bowlby Corp., 871 F.2d at 598 (Guy, J., dissenting).
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that existing in the trademark area. Unlike the Lanham Act provision,
§ 282 of the Patent Act expressly provides that “[t]he burden of establishing invalidity of a patent or any claim thereof shall rest on the party asserting such validity.”65 Nonetheless, the point remains that merely changing
the language of the patent law standard to “preponderance” by no means
ensures that courts will converge around a uniform approach to assessing
patent validity evidence. Trademark law suggests that a change to a preponderance standard may simply inject ambiguity as to the governing
message that the presumption of patent validity is intended to deliver. This
would then open the door to a plurality of different approaches to implementing the presumption in individual cases.
D.
Conclusions Regarding the Presumption’s Expressive Function
In targeting the presumption of validity for reform, perhaps the FTC
Report chose unwisely. For the reasons detailed above, changing the
words of the evidentiary standard might make little difference in case outcomes. At the same time, the overarching message that the presumption of
validity sends is such a potent indicator of the overall state of the patent
system that a proposal to alter it might provoke a visceral reaction within
the patent community that may undercut the credibility of other aspects of
the FTC patent reform agenda. Moreover, the proposal and the reaction is
might engender may serve to polarize the debate, activating latent tensions
between the antitrust and patent communities. It would be highly unfortunate if this proposal, and the reaction to it, diverts attention from other important proposals for patent reform appearing in the FTC’s Report, such as
the proposal for post-grant revocation, as discussed in more detail in the
following part.
IV.

INSTRUMENTAL FUNCTION OF THE PRESUMPTION OF
VALIDITY

While typical reform proposals, like those of the FTC Report, overlook
the expressive quality of the presumption of validity, they do focus considerable attention on the instrumental function of the presumption (and its
associated clear and convincing standard). The FTC Report’s instrumental
arguments for changing to a preponderance standard are plausible, but not
ironclad.

65. 35 U.S.C. § 282 (2000); see also New England Braiding Co. v. A.W. Chesterton
Co., 970 F.2d 878, 882 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (“The presumption acts as a procedural device
which places the burden of going forward with evidence and the ultimate burden of
persuasion of invalidity at trial on the alleged infringer.”).
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The Report’s principal arguments for reforming the presumption of validity are not expressly instrumentalist, but can be understood in instrumental terms. First, the FTC Report argues that the ex parte examination
scheme has proven to be of only limited effectiveness in discriminating
between patent-worthy and patent-unworthy inventions, so patentees
should not enjoy the benefit of “a heightened evidentiary standard” against
validity challenge in litigation.66 That is, as between the patentee and patent challenger, the limitations of ex parte practice counsel against insulating the patentee to such a great extent from the risk of error. Instead, the
patentee should bear a greater degree of risk of an erroneous judgment as
to validity.67
Second, the FTC Report asserts that the clear and convincing standard
facilitates anticompetitive uses of patents because patentees are emboldened in the knowledge that it will be difficult for any challenger to rid the
marketplace of a “bad” patent68 and, of course, correspondingly difficult to
make out a claim that the patent litigation was motivated by anticompetitive impulses.69 The FTC’s analysis is thoughtful and its arguments are
plausible. However, its treatment of the presumption of validity is cursory
and gives too little attention to at least two complicating factors: (1) the
interconnections between validity and scope doctrines; and (2) the inter66. FTC REPORT, supra note 2, ch. 5, at 28.
67. One weakness of a purely instrumental account of the presumption of validity, at
least as articulated in the referenced section of the FTC Report, is that it seems to
encourage an undue focus on allocating risks between the private litigants without
adequately addressing the risks (or benefits) running to third parties. Some third party
effects support the FTC’s proposal, but others do not.
A few simple examples suffice to make the point. Assume that litigation between a
patentee and a patent challenger results in a correct judgment that a patent is invalid. That
judgment has preclusive effect against the patentee. As a result, third parties enjoy the
benefit of operating in the patent-free environment, but only the patent challenger bears
the risk. Discarding the clear and convincing standard in favor of a preponderance
standard might seem attractive in such circumstances insofar as it might facilitate the
patent challenger in acting to rid the marketplace of an invalid patent, to the benefit of
both the challenger and the public.
Similarly, assume that litigation results in an erroneous judgment upholding patent
validity. The patent can be enforced against third parties and may de facto enjoy a
“strengthened” presumption of validity. Discarding the clear and convincing standard
again might appeal attractive in such circumstances.
68. This argument is facially problematic because it seems to start from the premise
that everyone can agree on which patents are in fact of “questionable validity,” when
resolving that issue is, of course, the very point of patent validity litigation.
69. For an explanation of the relevant law on allegations of anticompetitive patent
litigation, see HERBERT HOVENKAMP ET AL., 1 IP AND ANTITRUST 11-1 to -38 (2001 &
Supp. 2004).
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connections between validity litigation and other mechanisms for resolving validity disputes.
A.
Litigating Validity Versus Litigating Scope
While the FTC’s arguments are plausible, they suffer from tunnel vision. Patent validity issues do not exist in isolation from other patent law
doctrines.70 It is a mistake to suggest changes to patent validity doctrines
without accounting for the interconnections between validity and other
doctrines, such as patent scope, especially in light of the fact that the law
of patent scope has been particularly volatile in the past decade.
Consider the following possible consequence of adopting the FTC Report’s proposal concerning the presumption of validity. Current conventional wisdom holds that the Federal Circuit is pursuing a policy which
combines a relatively liberal approach to patent validity (meaning that patents are perceived as difficult to invalidate) with a relatively restrictive
approach to patent scope (meaning that patent infringement is perceived as
being easy to avoid, particularly infringement under the doctrine of
equivalents).71 Such an approach may reflect a view about the appropriate
balance between giving a fair reward to inventors and giving fair notice to
the public. Suppose that the Federal Circuit were subjected to a legislatively-imposed change to the evidentiary standard for overcoming the presumption of validity.72 If a legislative change made it easier for challengers to invalidate patents, might the Federal Circuit react by restructuring
its current restrictive approach to patent scope? For example, the court
might apply the claim construction axiom that courts will construe claims
70. For a few examples consider the connections between validity and claim
construction, validity and infringement generally, and validity and the limitations on
equivalency. See, e.g., Smithkline Diagnostics, Inc. v. Helena Labs. Corp., 859 F.2d 878,
882 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (stating that claims are construed consistently for validity and
infringement); Lewmar Marine, Inc. v. Barient, Inc., 827 F.2d 744, 747 (Fed. Cir. 1987)
(commenting on the symmetry between infringement and validity determinations);
Wilson Sporting Goods Co. v. David Geoffrey & Assoc., 904 F.2d 677, 685 (Fed. Cir.
1990) (holding that validity determinations are relevant to an infringement analysis that
uses the hypothetical claim methodology); see also Johnson & Johnston Assoc., Inc. v.
R.E. Serv. Co., 285 F.3d 1046, 1063 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (Lourie, J., concurring) (discussing
the interplay between foreseeability as an equivalency concept and obviousness).
71. For an acknowledgment of the conventional wisdom and citations to statistical
studies that may support the conventional wisdom, see, for example, FTC REPORT, supra
note 2, ch. 5, at 25.
72. I recognize that the clear and convincing standard is a judicial creation, and that
reform proposals contemplate that the Federal Circuit could change to the preponderance
standard without Congressional intervention. If the Federal Circuit cannot be persuaded
to change the standard, then presumably reform proposals would advocate that the
reforms be effectuated through legislative change.
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so as to preserve their validity, rather than the currently popular counteraxiom that courts are not entitled to rewrite claims.73 Additionally, the
Federal Circuit might adjust the verbal formulation for equivalency74 to
make it easier for patentees to capture infringers under the doctrine of
equivalents, or the court might relax the doctrine of prosecution history
estoppel by displaying a greater willingness to find that patentees had
overcome the Festo presumption.75
This notion—that action on the presumption of validity might precipitate an equal and opposite reaction in other doctrines, yielding zero net
momentum—need not be viewed as a prediction of Federal Circuit recalcitrance or general Federal Circuit peevishness. The Federal Circuit might
legitimately take the view that it has struck the right balance between validity and infringement (between reward to the patentee and notice to the
public), and that sound patent policy would demand a reconsideration of
the law of claim scope in response to a change in the law of patent validity. Whether this particular prediction about the Newtonian dynamics of
patent jurisprudence is accurate is largely beside the point. Policymakers
should not assume that a change to the presumption of validity will only
affect validity and will generate no compensating reaction elsewhere in the
patent system.
B.
The Presumption of Validity as a Channeling Mechanism
Just as patent validity doctrines do not exist in isolation from other
patent doctrines, patent litigation as a mechanism for resolving patent validity disputes does not exist in isolation from other mechanisms for resolving patent validity disputes. Those mechanisms are many, including
private action in the form of license negotiations or formal alternative dispute resolution and administrative action in the form of post-grant revocation schemes76 or even ex parte examination. Proposals to reform the presumption of validity seem to focus on how the reforms might change parties’ behavior in litigation, but seem to ignore the prospect that reforms
73. See Phillips v. AWH Corp., 363 F.3d 1207, 1218 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (Dyk, J.,
dissenting in part) (discussing axiom and counter-axiom).
74. See Warner-Jenkinson Co., Inc. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17, 39-40
(1997) (delegating from the Supreme Court to the Federal Circuit authority to establish
the precise verbal formulation for equivalency).
75. See Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 535 U.S. 722,
(2002) (establishing the Festo presumption); Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo
Kabushiki Co., 344 F.3d 1359 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (elaborating on the factors for rebutting
the Festo presumption), cert. denied, 121 S. Ct. 2018 (2004).
76. For a description of such schemes and a detailed proposal to create such a
scheme in U.S. law, see Mark D. Janis, Rethinking Reexamination: Toward a Viable
Administrative Revocation System for U.S. Law, 11 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 1 (1997).

2004]

REFORMING PATENT VALIDITY LITIGATION

939

might change parties’ incentives to resolve validity disputes through
mechanisms other than litigation.
The most serious potential impact concerns post-grant administrative
revocation. All other factors being equal, the FTC Report’s recommendation concerning the presumption of validity might work at cross-purposes
with the Report’s very important recommendation to create a post-grant
revocation system.77 To the extent that the presumption of validity operates as a channeling mechanism, directing validity disputes towards or
away from the courts, the proposal to discard the clear and convincing
standard may encourage patent challengers to resolve validity disputes in
court and correlatively discourage use of any newly-created administrative
revocation scheme.
This result would be a serious step backwards. As compared to validity
litigation, well-designed post-grant revocation schemes offer the promise
of quicker, cheaper resolution of patent validity disputes.78 While the Report argues that post-grant revocation is desirable because it reduces the
private costs of challenging validity,79 a more ambitious claim can be
made: such a system might reduce overall private costs of litigating validity—meaning private costs incurred by both the challenger and the patentee—if such a system diverts validity disputes away from the courts,
which are more expensive fora for both parties. If the facts bear this claim
out, we should retain a robust presumption of validity, exactly the opposite
of the FTC Report’s proposal.
Unfortunately, we have little experience so far with the use of the presumption of validity as a channeling device between roughly equivalent,
alternative fora for resolving validity disputes. For example, under current
law, the clear and convincing standard applies in litigation but not in reexamination.80 If all other factors were equal—if litigation and reexamination were roughly equivalent fora for resolving validity disputes—we
would expect that this combination of evidentiary standards would channel patent challengers away from litigation and towards reexamination.
This outcome has not occurred; from the patent challenger’s perspective,
even inter partes reexamination is not a rough substitute for litigation.81
77. For the FTC’s recommendation concerning post-grant administrative revocation,
see FTC REPORT, supra note 2, ch. 5, at 15-24.
78. Id. at 20. Of course, one should not underestimate the difficulty of designing a
revocation system well.
79. Id.
80. For a discussion of relevant precedent, see Janis, supra note 76, at 63-69.
81. For a discussion of the reasons, see Mark D. Janis, Inter Partes Reexamination,
10 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 481 (2000).
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The concept of the presumption and the evidentiary standard as channeling devices deserves more attention in policy debates over the instrumental function of the presumption of validity.82 In addition, the concept
ties in with a larger scholarly debate over the appropriate allocation of responsibility among institutions of the patent system for deciding closely
contested questions of patentability. In that larger debate, Professor Lemley has argued that the ex parte examination scheme is best designed to
provide a quick look at patentability, so that we should push close questions of patentability forward to another system that is better suited to resolve contested issues.83 The companion argument to Professor Lemley’s
view is that validity litigation is an expensive and cumbersome mechanism
for resolving patent validity, so that we should push at least some close
questions of patentability backwards to another system that is capable of
resolving contested issues, even if that other system lacks all of the trappings of litigation. Both arguments highlight the importance of creating an
intermediate space between the ex parte system and litigation, such as a
post-grant revocation scheme, and of also creating procedural mechanisms
that move disputes towards that intermediate space. A thoughtfullydesigned presumption of validity is one such mechanism.
A key task for future patent policymakers is to arrive at a thoughtful
design, one that achieves an optimal blend of ex parte examination, administrative revocation, and litigation for resolving validity disputes.
There is currently no clear choice among many alternatives. I have suggested in this Article that the merits of the current clear and convincing
standard as compared to the preponderance standard, but neither I nor
anyone else would claim that the current standard has been an unalloyed
success. Professor Rai has suggested that the clear and convincing standard might be restricted to patents that have survived post-grant revocation
proceedings, but has acknowledged that this scheme might disadvantage
truly pioneering inventions because such inventions might be so remote
from the prior art that no one would see fit to bring a post-grant revocation.84 Others have suggested that the Federal Circuit return to the rule that
82. The concept also has implications for another of the FTC Report’s arguments,
namely that the USPTO uses a preponderance standard in ex parte examination and thus,
the courts should also use the same standard in validity litigation. FTC REPORT, supra
note 2, ch. 5, at 28. This equivalency in standards is certainly not required, nor even
necessarily desirable, if the presumption is being used deliberately to channel disputes
either towards or away from the courts.
83. Mark A. Lemley, Rational Ignorance at the Patent Office, 95 NW. U. L. REV.
1495, 1508-11 (2001).
84. See Arti Rai, Engaging Facts and Policy: A Multi-Institutional Approach to
Patent System Reform, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 1035 (2003).
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the clear and convincing standard applies only to litigation challenges that
are based on prior art that the USPTO has already considered, but not as to
challenges based on other prior art.85
This proposal that the clear and convincing standard only apply to the
considered prior art raises a number of questions. First, what does it mean
for the USPTO to “consider” prior art? Does it mean that there is actual
evidence that the examiner studied and applied the reference or does it
merely mean that the examiner completed the ministerial steps necessary
to allow the prior art to be listed on the front page of the patent? Second,
would a return to this rule merely encourage parties to submit more voluminous information disclosure statements, adding to examiners’ workloads and decreasing the available time that an examiner can spend studying any given prior art reference? Third, despite Federal Circuit statements
to the contrary, do courts today de facto withhold the clear and convincing
standard when the challenger presents prior art that the USPTO has never
considered?
My goal in this Article is not to select a clear winner from among these
alternatives. Rather, my goal is to point out that the presumption of validity, even when viewed solely in instrumental terms, can play a significant
role in mediating between alternative fora for resolving patent validity
questions. Reform proposals concerning the presumption of validity
should take this role more seriously.
V.

CONCLUSION

Some eighty years ago, in Radio Corp. v. Radio Engineering Laboratories, Inc., Justice Cardozo wrote perceptively about the presumption of
patent validity.86 Although his opinion preceded the codification of the
85. See, e.g., Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Policy Levers in Patent Law, 89 VA.
L. REV. 1575, 1660 (2003); Charles E. Phipps, The Presumption of Administrative
Correctness: The Proper Basis for the Clear and Convincing Evidence Standard, 10 FED.
CIR. B.J. 143 (2000). For another variation, see Clarence J. Fleming, Should the Clear
and Convincing Standard for Rebutting the Presumption of Validity Apply When the
Challenger Raises a Substantial New Question of Patentability?, 80 J. PAT. &
TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 146 (1998) (proposing a legislative change to § 282 that would
specify that the preponderance standard applies when the challenger raises a substantial
new question of patentablility). The “substantial new question” standard appears in
current reexamination provisions. 35 U.S.C. § 302 (2000). It has a dismal history, in
which the USPTO has used the standard to find a substantial new question almost as a
matter of routine. The standard has never proven capable of facilitating finely-calibrated
judgments distinguishing between worthy and frivolous challenges to patentability and
would likely result in the use of the preponderance standard in nearly all litigated cases.
86. 293 U.S. 1, 7-8 (1934) (internal citations omitted).

942

BERKELEY TECHNOLOGY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 19:923

presumption of validity in the 1952 Act,87 his words are still relevant today:
A patent regularly issued, and even more obviously a patent issued after a hearing of all the rival claimants, is presumed to be
valid until the presumption has been overcome by convincing
evidence of error. The force of that presumption has found varying expression in this and other courts. Sometimes it is said that
in a suit for infringement, when the defense is a prior invention,
“the burden of proof to make good this defense” is “upon the
party setting it up,” and “every reasonable doubt should be resolved against him.” Again it is said that :the presumption of the
validity of the patent is such that the defense of invention by another must be established by the clearest proof—perhaps beyond
reasonable doubt.” The context suggests that in these and like
phrases the courts were not defining a standard in terms of scientific accuracy or literal precision, but were offering counsel and
suggestion to guide the course of judgment. Through all the verbal variances, however, there runs this common core of thought
and truth, that one otherwise an infringer who assails the validity
of a patent fair upon its face bears a heavy burden of persuasion,
and fails unless his evidence has more than a dubious preponderance.88

In response to the FTC’s proposal, I am dubious about the preponderance. The FTC has not made its case for altering the standards associated
with the presumption of patent validity, either by a clear and convincing
evidence standard or even by a preponderance. The presumption of patent
validity is as much a malleable expression of ambitions as it is an instrument of precise calibration. Reform proposals should bear in mind the presumption’s dual character as both expression and policy tool.

87. Patent Act, Pub. L. No. 82-593, 66 Stat. 729 (1952) (codified as amended in 35
U.S.C.)
88. Radio Corp., 293 U.S. at 7-8.

